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Introduction
This article explores the idea of using tribal sovereignty to establish a
comprehensive environmental review process for development proposals that
would affect the environment of Indian country. In the context of actions
proposed by federal government agencies, the process established under the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has become the basic model for
comprehensive environmental review. NEPA requires the responsible federal
agency to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) prior to taking any
"major Federal action significantly affecting the' quality of the human
environment."' This requirement has been implemented through regulations
issued by the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Among
other things, the CEQ regulations establish a screening process to help federal
agencies determine which proposed actions require an EIS and which require
a less detailed environmental assessment (EA).' Quite a number of states
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
2. 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500-08 (1996).
3. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3 (1996). See generally DANiEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND
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have established review procedures similar to the federal NEPA process uAder
state laws that are commonly known as "little NEPAs" or "mini-NEPAs."4
The enactment and implementation of tribal "mini-NEPAs" could yield a
variety of benefits for tribal governments and for the people who live and do
business in Indian country. This article examines a number of issues raised
by the development and implementation of a tribal mini-NEPA. (Other
generic terms could be used to describe a tribal mini-NEPA. For example,
a commonly used term for a state mini-NEPA is "state environmental policy
act" or "SEPA." Applying this term to a tribal mini-NEPA yields "tribal
environmental policy act" or "TEPA."5). In 1993, one of the authors drafted
a model tribal mini-NEPA, which is captioned a "Model Tribal Environmental
Review Code."6 At several points the article refers to the text of that draft,
although the article also considers other approaches. With more than 500
federally recognized Indian tribes (including Alaska Native villages), one
model surely cannot serve the needs of all. Moreover, many tribes already
have established some kind of environmental review process, although, to the
authors' knowledge, no one has attempted to compile and analyze tribal laws
on this subject (which would be a challenging task). This article seeks to raise
the visibility of the basic concept of using tribal law to establish NEPA-like
review processes and to highlight some of the issues that should be considered
by tribal officials and attorneys who are considering the enactment of such a
law.
L Reasons for Enacting a Tribal Mini-NEPA

The enactment of a tribal mini-NEPA may serve a variety of purposes.
Before enacting such legislation though, tribal officials should have a clear
understanding of just what they hope to accomplish. They should try to reach
consensus among themselves on which legislative purposes are most important

LmGATION § 2.07 (2d ed., 1992 & annual updates).
4. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 3,§ 12.01.

5. One of the authors is involved in a project being carried out by the Tulalip Tribes of
Washington, with financial assistance from the Environmental Protection Agency, to develop
guidance documents for tribes considering the enactment of a tribal mini-NEPA. The Tulalip
Tribes have chosen to use the term "TEPA," calling its project the Model TEPA Project. This
project is a collaborative effort that aims to provide tribes throughout the United States (including
Alaska) with guidance in developing and adopting tribal environmental review codes. The Project
also addresses tribal participation in NEPA. The first phase of the Project (scoping and
assessment) is underway, with the entire Project scheduled for completion in the fall of 1998. The
Project Coordinator is Gillian Mittelstaedt, who can be contacted through the Tulalip Tribes at
(206) 338-2151.
6. Dean B. Suagee, A Model Tribal Environmental Code (visited Mar. 27, 1997)

<http://www.law.und.nodak.edu/telp/modelcode.html> (presented at the National Tribal
Environmental Council First Annual Conference, Albuquerque, N.M., Nov. 14-18, 1993)
[hereinafter Model Tribal Code].

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

and which are secondary. If they do this, their understanding of legislative
purposes can inform their choices among options. This section of the article
discusses some of the objectives that might be accomplished through the
enactment of a tribal mini-NEPA.
A. Controlling "Development" Within the Reservation
By establishing an environmental review process, a tribal government could
assert control over a broad range of activities that may cause adverse
environmental and cultural impacts within its reservation or other lands under
its jurisdiction. The environmental review of projects could become a
proactive exploration of alternative ways of achieving the objectives of a
proposal rather than a reactive exercise in trying to control the environmental,
socioeconomic, and cultural damage that a project would cause. The most
appropriate mix of mechanisms to exercise such control will vary from tribe
to tribe and should reflect the tribe's cultural values and practices. A key
factor in determining the mix of mechanisms is the extent to which a tribe has
managed to retain (or regain) ownership of its lands. In light of recent United
States Supreme Court decisions, a tribe's environmental regulatory authority
is most firmly grounded when it seeks to regulate activities on lands that are
owned either by the tribe or tribal members in trust (or subject to a federal
restraint on alienation). For tribes that retain all or most of their reservation
lands in tribal trust status, a formal process may not be needed to control
"development." Nevertheless, a NEPA-like review process may be useful
particularly where the functions of tribal government are carried out by many
different subdivisions, where tribal enterprises operate with relative autonomy,
or where tribal members are regarded as being subject to few limits under
tribal law in developing their possessory land holdings.
Tribal authority over the activities of nonmembers on lands within
reservation boundaries but owned in fee by nonmembers is most firmly
grounded in contexts in which Congress has delegated authority to tribes 7 or
has otherwise recognized that retained inherent tribal sovereignty covers the
kind of conduct to be regulated.' In the absence of delegation or affirmative

7. E.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (upholding delegation of authority
from Congress to a tribe to control sale of alcoholic beverages on fee lands within reservation
boundaries).
8. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (3), (4) (1994) (recognizing and affirming tribal criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians, reversing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990)); see Nell Jessup
Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992);
see also Dean B. Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, CrossCulturalBridges, and Common Ground,21 VT. L. REV. 145, 182-84, 206-06 (1996) (discussing
two statutes in which Congress has recognized tribal authority over all lands within reservation
boundaries, including fee lands, the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470x6 (1994), and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001
to 3013 (1994)).
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recognition, tribal authority may exist under either of the two prongs of the
so-called Montanatest: (1) where nonmembers "enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases,
or other arrangements"; and (2) where "the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands ... threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe."' This article does
not devote much attention to Montanaand subsequent cases, which have been
addressed in a substantial body of literature.'" Rather, this article simply
notes that the assertion and exercise of tribal authority over non-Indians on
fee lands must be informed by an awareness of this body of law.
B. CoordinatingEnvironmental Review Requirements
NEPA is but one federal environmental review requirement. There are
numerous other federal environmental review and consultation requirements
that are concerned with particular kinds of resources or aspects of the natural
world. If an EIS is prepared for a proposed federal action, the CEQ
regulations mandate that the EIS also should address compliance with any
other federal environmental laws that apply to the proposed action."
Similarly, if an EA is required, the EA should at least identify any other
federal requirements that would apply. Thus, if a federal action is required as
part of a development in Indian country, the NEPA process can be used to
identify any other federal laws, as well as tribal and state laws, that apply.
How well NEPA works in achieving coordination depends on many things,
including which federal agencies are involved and how effectively they carry
out their NEPA responsibilities.
By enacting a tribal mini-NEPA, the tribal government can put a tribal
agency in charge of coordinating the environmental review and consultation
requirements established by various laws. Such a tribal little NEPA would
serve as a comprehensive or blanket environmental review process. For the
regulated public, the main benefit of such coordination is that requirements
are identified early so that compliance (or avoidance through alternatives) can
be factored into the schedule. The regulated public seeks what might be called
"one-stop shopping" for permits and other clearances. Although this may be
an elusive objective for a complex project subject to the regulatory authority
of different agencies, a mini-NEPA can achieve coordination at least. A major
benefit for the governmental entity exercising regulatory authority is that
9. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
10. E.g., Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1991);
Mary Beth West, NaturalResources Development on Indian Reservations: Overview of TribaL
State, and FederalJurisdiction, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 71 (1992); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit
Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353 (1994); David H. Getches, Conquering the CulturalFrontier: The New
Subjectivisim of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL L. REV. 1573 (1996).

11. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25(a) (1996).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

regulated entities are less tempted to try to get away with noncompliance.
Another benefit is that perceptions by the public that a tribal regulatory
agency is doing an effective job may lead to broad-based public support for
the agency and its mission.
C. Empowering the Affected Public
A NEPA-like review process could serve to empower the reservation
populace, Indian and non-Indian, by providing a structure through which
interested individuals and groups could become involved in tribal decisionmaking processes. A little NEPA can empower the regulated public - the
people who seek to carry out development activities that the tribal government
seeks to control - by setting up a process with clearly prescribed procedures
and standards for decision making, a "transparent" set of rules to let persons
in the regulated public know what they must do to get to a governmental
decision point and to give such persons a reasonable basis for predicting the
outcome of such decisions.
In these ways, the environmental review process can be more than just an
assertion of tribal governmental authority - it can be a mechanism for
making tribal government more accountable. The concept of sovereignty
embodies not only power but also responsibility. For tribal governments, this
means not only responsibility toward past, present, and future generations of
tribal members, but also toward nonmembers, both Indian and non-Indian,
who reside within reservation boundaries. Tribal sovereignty also may mean
responsibility toward culturally important plant and animal populations and
sacred places. Two key concepts in carrying out such responsibilities are due
process and public participation: due process for persons whose property and
liberty interests are affected by tribal agency decisions; and public
participation in rulemaking and other policy development conducted by tribal
agencies. 2
D. Optimizing a Tribal Role in Federal EnvironmentalLaw
Most federal environmental laws enacted over the past quarter century
forge a partnership between the federal government and the states. Under
these federal statutes, states have substantial responsibilities and may take on
additional "delegable" responsibilities if they so choose. 3 States assume the
additional responsibilities to avoid direct control by the federal Environmental

12. See DEAN B. SUAGEE & JOHN P. LOWNDES, DUE PROCESS AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
INTRIBAL. ENvIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS (presented at, and included in the course materials of, the
Federal Bar Association 21st Annual Indian Law Conference, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Apr. I112, 1996). A somewhat expanded and updated version of this paper was presented at, and
published in the proceedings of, Sovereignty Symposium X, Tulsa, Oklahoma, June 9-11, 1997.
13. See generally Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
ContemporaryModels, 54 MD. L. REv. 1141 (1995).
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Protection Agency (EPA). Federal laws generally do not preempt state laws,
but do establish an overall framework, along with some minimum
requirements for state environmental protection programs. States may
establish requirements that are more stringent, and they may enact laws to
cover subjects not covered by the federal laws. Thus, citizens can take their
environmental concerns to the federal or the state sovereign or both.
For the most part, federal environmental laws enacted in the 1970s
included few specific references to Indian tribes or Indian lands. Congress did
not demonstrate much awareness of, or concern for, reservation environments,
and tribes generally had more pressing concerns. This was, after all, the early
years of the self-determination era in federal Indian policy, 4 and many tribal
governments were engaged in taking control of basic governmental programs
like health care, education, and social services. In 1984, the EPA adopted a
"Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian
Reservations,"' 5 in which it recognized tribal governments as sovereign
entities which are "the primary parties for setting standards, making
environmental policy decisions and managing programs for reservations,
consistent with Agency standards and regulations."'" In recent years,
Congress has amended many of the federal laws in ways that are generally
consistent with the EPA's 1984 policy. - in essence ratifying the EPA's
policy. These laws now provide that tribes, if they choose, may assume roles
similar to the roles performed by states. 7 In response to the mandates of
these amended statutes, the EPA has issued numerous amendments to its
regulations to establish procedures for tribes to be treated as states for a wide
variety of purposes.
These changes in the federal laws present tribal governments with an
historic opportunity and an enormous challenge. Obviously, tribes that

14. See Faux S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 180-206 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (discussing the self-determination era). The Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2206 (1975) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 13a, 450-450n, 455-458e (1994)), the statute establishing a framework
for tribal governments taking over programs that would otherwise be administered by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs or Indian Health Service, had not even been enacted when several of the major
federal environmental statutes became law.
15. EPA, EPA Policy Statement for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian
Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984).
16. Id.
17. Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-l l(a)(t) (1994) (treating tribes as
states for certain purposes); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA, also known as Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (1994) (treating tribes
substantially the same as states for certain purposes); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a)
(1994) (treating tribes as states for certain purposes); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)
(1994) (treating tribes as states for certain purposes). See generally David F. Coursen, Tribes as
States: Indian Tribal Authority to Regulate and Enforce Federal Environmental Law and
Regulations, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,579 (1993).
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succeed in fashioning effective environmental regulatory programs will be
better able to preserve the quality of their reservation environments for the
benefit of present and future generations of tribal members and to protect and
restore the natural environments that sustain tribal cultures. Perhaps as
important in the context of American democracy, effective tribal programs
will serve a broad range of public interests that extend well beyond
reservation boundaries. Since important public interests are involved, it is not
surprising that EPA regulations require tribes that are treated as states to
provide meaningful opportunities for public involvement."
But how should tribal governments go about building effective programs?
The enactment of a tribal law that establishes a NEPA-like environmental
review process can help tribal officials determine their environmental
priorities. If a tribal mini-NEPA provides for a comprehensive or "blanket"
environmental review requirement for proposed development activities on
lands under tribal jurisdiction, and if the tribal process requires that all
applicable federal, tribal and state requirements be met before clearance can
be given under the tribal mini-NEPA, then tribal officials will have a
reasonable degree of confidence that applicable requirements are being met
for any given project. Tribal agency officials and staff will also gain
experience with the practices of federal agencies in carrying out their
regulatory programs. Such experience should be useful in deciding whether
tribal interests would be better served by taking over delegable programs, by
letting federal agencies continue to run them, or by entering into cooperative
agreements with state agencies.
H. Options for Developing an Environmental Review Process
Once tribal officials and legal staff have decided to establish an
environmental review process, several different approaches exist. The options
include: (a) making the federal NEPA process serve tribal purposes;
(b) developing a tribal little NEPA based on a state little NEPA;
(c) developing a comprehensive land use regulatory program, perhaps based
on a state statute; (d) using a model tribal code such as the Model Tribal
Environmental Review Code," adapting it for the particular circumstances
of the tribe; and (e) establishing a review process that is less than
comprehensive, a process that focuses on aspects of the environment that are
particularly important to the tribe.

18. See 40 C.F.R. § 25 (1996). In particular, 40 C.F.R. § 25.10 establishes minimal
requirements for rule making by states, including tribes treated as states, although these

requirements do not preempt the requirements of a state administrative procedure act, if one
exists. See generally Suagee & Lowndes, supra note 12.
19. Model Tribal Code, supra note 6.
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A. Making the FederalNEPA Serve Tribal Purposes
One approach to establish a blanket tribal environmental review process is
to make the existing federal NEPA process work to serve tribal interests.
Many kinds of activities that cause environmental impacts in Indian country
involve some kind of federal agency action. If a federal action is a
prerequisite for or an indispensable aspect of an activity that causes
environmental impacts (such as federal permitting of a nonfederal entity), the
responsible federal agency must comply with the review process established
under NEPA. 1
Since NEPA applies to a variety of actions in Indian country that cause
environmental impacts, tribes can serve their interests in having an effective
environmental review process by becoming actively involved in, and asserting
control over, the federal NEPA process within their reservations. 1 Two key
methods of ensuring involvement are to have tribal staff prepare and review
NEPA documents and for tribal officials to wait for NEPA documents to be
prepared and reviewed before making decisions on proposed actions. Another
key step that tribes can take is to enact tribal laws that expressly require the
preparation of an EA when any federal agency is considering a proposed
action that may affect important tribal interests. For agencies within the
Department of tie Interior, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the
Department's procedures for implementing the CEQ's NEPA regulations
expressly require preparation of an EA prior to any proposed federal action
that would violate a tribal law.' Thus, it would be quite simple to make
Interior agencies, including the BIA, prepare EAs before they take or approve
actions that may adversely affect important tribal interests by enacting a tribal
law requiring an EA for certain kinds of actions, although, practically
speaking, litigation may sometimes be necessary to force federal agencies to
comply.
B. State EnvironmentalPolicy Acts
Fifteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted environmental
policy acts modeled on NEPA?' Such state statutes are often called "little
NEPAs" or "mini-NEPAs. ' These statutes vary somewhat from state to

20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994). See generally Dean B. Suagee, The Application of the
NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act to "Development" in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv.

377 (1991). The Bureau of Indian Affairs recently revised its procedures for compliance with
NEPA. Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Environmental Policy Act: Implementing Procedures
(516 DM 6, Appendix 4), 61 Fed. Reg. 67,845 (Dec. 24, 1996).
21. See Suagee, supra note 20, at 426-27.
22. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 516 Departmental Manual 2, app. 2, § 2.10; see Suagee, supra
note 20, at 398 n.79.
23. See generally MANDELKER, supranote 3, § 12.01.

24. See id.
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state but generally require state agencies, and in some states local government
agencies as well, to prepare or oversee the preparation of environmental
impacts statements on proposed actions that may significantly affect the
environment. This article does not examine state little NEPAs in detail to see
what kind of models they would make for tribes. This article notes, however,
that state little NEPAs exist in a context of state environmental and land use
regulatory laws, and in a context of governmental institutions that have been
created through the state's sovereignty, and much of this context may not be
very relevant to Indian country. On the other hand, if a tribe's reservation is
located in a state that has a little NEPA and if the tribe and reservation
residents do business with environmental consultants and with architecturalengineering firms that are familiar with the process created by the state's little
NEPA, using the state statute as a model may be the best approach. This
would seem to be particularly appropriate guidance where the tribe's main
legislative purpose is to simplify and coordinate environmental review
requirements and where many of the people who will be covered by the tribe's
system are already familiar with the state's system. In deciding whether to use
a state little NEPA as a model, tribal officials should consider, of course,
whether people who have experience with the state little NEPA believe it to
be an effective law.
C. State Land Use Control Law
Typically political subdivisions of states carry out land use regulation, such
as zoning ordinances, pursuant to state enabling legislation. Many tribes have
enacted zoning ordinances, but the Supreme Court's decision in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation" renders tribal
authority to zone fee lands subject to challenge. Some states have taken a less
common approach to land use control by enacting statewide or regional land
use codes. One such state statute is Vermont's Act 250,' enacted in 1970
and one of the earliest statewide land use laws in the nation. Act 250 was
enacted in response to "development" pressures on small communities that
lacked planning and regulatory capabilities and is administered through a
bottom-up process, open to citizen participation, that puts the decision-making
power in the hands of the affected communities. A major concern of the Act
is to allow citizens to make sure that proposed development fits the culture
and character of the affected community. This article discusses certain aspects
of Act 250.

25. 4.92 U.S. 408 (1989). For a critique of this decision, see Singer, supra note 10, at 6-7.
26. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6108 (1993 & Supp. 1996). See generally RICHARD
OLIVER BROOKS, TOWARD COMMUNITY SUSTAINABILITY: VERMONT'S ACt 250 (1996).
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D. A Model TribalLittle NEPA
The Model Tribal Environmental Review Code is one approach to
developing a mini-NEPA for tribes This model draws on the federal NEPA
and on the Model Land Development Code, s which was published by the
American Law Institute (ALI) in 1976. The ALI's Model Code was the
culmination of a fifteen-year effort to remake state zoning and subdivision
laws, which were regarded as flawed and outdated mechanisms for exercising
governmental police power to control land use in the interests of public
health, safety and welfare.' Although the ALI Model Code has not been
widely adopted by the states to date, it represents a major improvement over
traditional zoning and subdivision laws. Two key features of the ALI Model
Code made it particularly useful as a model for fashioning a model tribal
mini-NEPA: (1) the governmental institutions charged with carrying out the
law; and (2) the permit process that the law uses as a mechanism to control
development. Parts I and IV explore these two ideas.
E. A Review Process with Limited Scope
For a variety of reasons, a tribal legislature may not want to establish a
comprehensive environmental review process. A tribe may not have enough
money and staff to administer a blanket review process; tribal officials may
be more concerned about some kinds of environmental impacts than others.
For such reasons, a tribal legislature might consider enacting a review process
with a more limited scope, focused on specific kinds of resources, such as
water quality, wildlife habitat, or traditional cultural properties. Over time a
tribe might establish several different limited scope review processes. Each
such process may serve a tribe's interests well, but tribal officials may find it
challenging to ensure that such processes complement, and do not conflict
with, each other.
III. Institutionsfor Carrying Out a Tribal "Little NEPA"
For an environmental review process to be effective, one or more
governmental agencies must be charged with responsibilities for carrying out
the law. While this may seem self-evident, it is nevertheless a matter of
critical importance. The authors believe that, if a tribe really wants to create
an effective environmental review process, it must either create a new
governmental institution or add responsibilities to an existing governmental
institution, or do both. Assuming that most tribes have real limits on their

27. Model Tribal Code, supra note 6.
28. MODEL LAND DEv. CODE (1976) (complete text adopted by the ALI at Washington,
D.C., May 21, 1975, and reporters commentary).
29. Id. at ix-x.
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human and financial resources, how can a tribe do this? In this part we
consider some of the options. This part also discusses the issue of why a
tribal legislative body should consider delegating to an agency of tribal
government the decision-making authority for environmental review of
specific proposals.
A. Assigning Responsibilities
In enacting a tribal little NEPA, one of the key issues that a tribal
legislative body should consider is how to assign responsibilities among its
governmental subdivisions. At one end of the spectrum, a little NEPA can
make each governmental subdivision responsible for analyzing the
environmental impacts of the actions that it takes. At the other end, a single
agency can be charged with all of the responsibility.
1. Universal Responsibility
Under the federal NEPA, each federal agency has been charged with the
responsibility to analyze the environmental impacts of its proposed actions and
to use these analyses in making its decisions. (When agencies respond to
externally initiated proposals, the applicants generally bear the cost of
preparing the analyses with agencies responsible for their content.) In giving
every agency this mandate, Congress sought to make agencies develop the
capacity to integrate environmental concerns into their planning and decision
making; congressional sponsors hoped that this would push agencies in the
direction of making decisions that cause fewer adverse affects on the
environment. In choosing to make all agencies responsible, Congress also
chose not to set up any one agency with the power to second guess or veto
agency decisions (at least not based on NEPA)." Congress has given EPA
a mandate to comment on the EISs prepared by other federal agencies,3 1 and
the CEQ regulations provide for any agency with jurisdiction by law or
special expertise to comment on EISs prepared by other agencies and to
participate in the preparation of EISs as cooperating agencies. No agency,
however, has a mandate to force any other agency to fulfill its NEPA
responsibilities. Rather, the principal mechanism for forcing an agency to
fulfill its NEPA responsibilities has been for private parties, or nonfederal
agencies, to file lawsuits in federal court. The state little NEPAs generally
take a similar approach, making each state agency responsible for assessing
the environmental impacts of its actions 3

30. The CEQ regulations do provide a rarely used process through which one agency can
refer a decision pending before another agency for which an EIS has been prepared to the office
of the President for resolution. 40 C.F.R. pt. 1504.1, 1504.2. 1504.3 (1996).
31. Clean Air Act § 309, 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (1994).
32. 4-0 C.F.R. §§ 1501.6, 1503.2 (1996).
33. MANDELKER, supra note 3, § 12.01.
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Under universal responsibility, no one agency has supervisory authority
which may cause compliance problems. In the Indian country context, such
problems might render the tribal code totally ineffective unless the tribal
legislature expressly authorizes lawsuits against tribal agencies. Another
drawback to the universal approach for some tribal governments, particularly
smaller ones, is that it might be counterproductive to require all tribal
government agencies to develop the capacity to produce environmental
documents.
2. Centralized Responsibility
An alternative to universal responsibility is for a single agency to be
charged with preparing (or overseeing contracts for the preparation of)
environmental documents. If a tribal agency is given such responsibility
without sufficient resources, however, the resultant inability to produce
environmental documents in a timely way may lead to a pattern of
noncompliance. To avoid this problem tribal legislation could assign
responsibility 'to each tribal agency but also provide for the transfer of
program funds to the tribal agency that has the capacity to produce
environmental documents (or the detailing of staff from the environmental
agency to the program agency).
3. Oversight Authority
A tribal little NEPA could feature a combination of universal and
centralized responsibility, in which each agency has responsibilities but one
agency has oversight authority. The Model Tribal Environmental Review
Code does this, by imposing responsibility on each tribal agency to prepare
environmental assessments for its actions (or ensure that environmental
documents are prepared for externally initiated proposals subject to its
approval) and by setting up an Environmental Review Commission with
authority to issue or deny permits after reviewing the environmental
documents.'
Vermont's Act 250 can be seen as an example of universal responsibility
with oversight authority. Although Vermont does not have a little NEPA,
Act 250 makes a permit from the appropriate District Environmental
Commission a requirement for any construction project proposed by a state
agency or municipal government that involves more than ten acres." Thus
each such governmental subdivision must comply with the substantive and
procedural requirements for obtaining a permit from a distinct
governmental agency.

34. Model Tribal Code, supra note 6, §§ 501, 503, 504, 505, 703.
35. VT. STAT..ANN. tit. 10, § 6081 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
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B. Different Kinds of Agencies
Most tribal governments conduct their business through an assortment
of governmental institutions or agencies. For purposes of fashioning a
tribal little NEPA, these agencies can be divided into two basic categories,
which we refer to as administrative agencies and independent regulatory
agencies. For purposes of this article, what distinguishes administrative
agencies from independent regulatory agencies is that head personnel of
administrative agencies are more or less directly accountable to elected
official;, while the way in which independent regulatory agencies are set
up is intended to ensure that decisions are made free of political influence.
1. Administrative Agencies
Administrative agencies go by a variety of names, such as departments,
divisions and offices. In most tribal governments, as in the federal
government and the states, administrative agencies are organized
hierarchically, e.g., the head of a department exercises supervision over the
heads of several divisions and offices. In the context of federal and state
governments, administrative agencies are typically accountable to the
executive branch of government, while in many tribes, executive and
legislative functions are combined in a single governing body. A tribal
little NEPA can assign responsibilities to administrative agencies using
either of the three approaches outlined above: universal or centralized
responsibility, or universal responsibility with one agency assigned
oversight authority.
2. Independent Regulatory Agencies
The creation of an independent regulatory agency is a common way for
a legislative body to vest an agency with decision-making authority that is
protected from influence by elected officials. A legislative body might
want to do this for reasons relating to fairness and due process. For
example, issuing a permit for one proposal may mean denying a permit for
another, and fairness suggests that the choice should not be based on
factors such as which applicant has stronger connections to elected
officials. Moreover, American jurisprudence regards an unbiased decision
maker to be an essential aspect of due process in adjudication by
administrative agencies." A tribal legislature might want to use this
approach to provide neutrality for situations in which a tribal

36. 2 KENNETH CuLp DAVIS &RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 4361, 67-91 (3d ed., 1994). Creating an independent agency is not the only way to ensure an
unbiased decision maker. Another approach is for administrative agencies to use administrative
law judges to render recommended decisions.
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administrative agency is required to obtain a permit from another tribal
agency.7
Typically, an independent regulatory agency is comprised of a board of
commissioners who are appointed by the chief executive, in some cases
subject to confirmation by the legislature. Commissioners are typically
appointed for fixed terms of office, and the expiration dates are often
staggered in order to avoid simultaneous turnover of a majority of the
positions. Independent agencies are not, of course, completely free of
political influence: legislative bodies can assert control by reducing their
budgets or changing the laws they administer; executive branch agencies
may decline to give them support in enforcing their decisions.
The Model Tribal Environmental Review Code features an independent
regulatory agency, called an Environmental Review Commission (ERC),
comprised of three commissioners." Vermont's Act 250 features nine
independent District Environmental Commissions, with Commissioners
appointed by the Governor." A Tribal ERC could be set up in a variety
of ways. Commissioners might be appointed or elected. The heads of
certain tribal departments and possibly certain elected officials might be
called to serve an ERC. (Although it might compromise the independence
of an ERC to have Department heads serve as commissioners, this
approach might yield benefits that would make such a compromise
acceptable. For example, if a tribe has an established practice of bringing
relevant department heads together to review NEPA documents for
proposed federal actions, creating an ERC as an new institution may
disrupt the existing process, which may have been working pretty well. In
such cases, a tribal little NEPA might simply formalize the existing
process, or it might use the existing process as a transitional phase in
building an ERC.) There is no magic number of commissioners: three
might be right for a small tribe, while a larger number might be preferable
for a larger tribe. If the ERC decides matters by majority vote, an odd
number might be preferable, but an ERC might decide matters by
consensus.
Service on the commission would entail reviewing documents and
attending periodic meetings, perhaps monthly depending on the work load.
It may be possible to fund such a commission on a shoestring, if respected
members of the community are willing to serve on a volunteer basis or for

37. EPA has expressed some concern over how to assure impartiality in such situations. E.g.,
53 Fed. Reg. 37,401 (1988) (discussing regulatory independence in the context of the Safe
Drinking Water Act); 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991) (discussing regulatory independence in the
context of water quality standards under section 303 and certification requirements under section
401 of the Clean Water Act).
38. Model Tribal Code, supra note 6, § 301.
39. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6021 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
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modest compensation. Tribal college faculty might be willing to serve.
Tribal members who serve on university faculties or hold similar positions
in off-reservation communities might be called. In some cases it may be
desirable to consider respected non-Indians as commissioners or to serve
in some advisory capacity.
3. Lazyers of Responsibility and Oversight
A tribal legislature can use administrative agencies and independent
regulatory agencies in a variety of combinations to create layers of
responsibility and oversight authority. If the tribal legislation establishes
an Environmental Review Commission (ERC) with authority to issue
permits for development (as provided in the Model Tribal Environmental
Review Code), any tribal administrative agency that proposes to carry out
(or approve) a development activity would have to obtain a permit from
the ERC, but before issuing a permit the ERC may be required to consult
with various tribal agencies, and with federal and state agencies.
Consultation might be required with such tribal entities as: (a) tribal
administrative agencies with expertise in natural resources, wildlife and
environmental matters; (b) separate independent commissions that may
have been given jurisdiction over matters such as cultural heritage
resources and sacred places; or (c) relevant committees of the tribal
legislature. For large reservations it may be desirable for the ERC itself
to involve more than one level of review, such as by having local level
commissions decide most matters with a right of appeal to a reservation
wide commission.
The options are virtually limitless, and choices should be made based
on a tribe's needs and priorities. If a tribal legislature chooses to assign
review authority to a variety of entities, an ERC can perform the crucial
role of making sure that all applicable consultations and clearances have
been accomplished before a project is permitted to be carried out.
C. DelegatingAuthority
If a tribal little NEPA features an ERC, the tribal legislature must
delegate sufficient authority to the ERC to enable it to carry out its
responsibilities. Many tribal legislators are reluctant to delegate authority,
but if a little NEPA is going to work the tribal legislature cannot retain all
authority to itself, even if a tribal little NEPA uses administrative agencies
rather than an independent regulatory agency.
1. Legislative Authority
Congress and the state legislatures typically delegate some of their
legislative authority to administrative and independent agencies. These
agencies carry out such delegations through the process known as
rulemaking, i.e., promulgating "rules" or "regulations" to implement
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statutes, adding details and clarifying ambiguities in the process. Federal
agencies that engage in rulemaking are subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act' and the body of federal administrative law, and state
agencies are subject to similar state laws.4 ' The use of rulemaking by
tribal agencies is generally a fairly recent phenomenon and far from a
widespread practice. Some tribes have enacted their own administrative
procedure acts, but such laws, where they do exist, are generally of recent
vintage. Thus to use the concept of rulemaking in a tribal little NEPA may
require work on building the framework of tribal administrative law. This
may include establishing procedures to provide for community and public
involvement when a tribal agency conducts rulemaking.
2. Adjudicatory Authority
When agencies make decisions that affect the interests of individuals on
particularized grounds, they are said to engage in adjudication. To do this
they must be vested with authority that derives from the legislative body
that created them. The term adjudication applies when an environmental
agency such as an ERC issues or denies permits for development, and it
also applies when such an agency considers appeals from its decisions. As
with rulemaking, the practice of delegating adjudicatory authority to tribal
agencies is not yet in very widespread use. As tribes become more
engaged in administering environmental regulatory programs this practice
may become more widely accepted, since it offers a familiar means of
providing due process for individuals whose property and liberty interests
are affected by tribal government decisions."
For tribal legislators who are reluctant to delegate permitting authority,
we suggest a variation: delegate authority to the ERC to issue permits but
retain authority to veto permits it grants (or vest the tribal chief executive
with veto authority). This would allow elected tribal officials to stop
projects that they believe would be detrimental to tribal interests, but
would not allow project proponents to ignore the permit process. Of
course, the authority of tribal officials to veto a permit is only as sound as
the tribe's power to require a permit in the first place. In addition, such a
veto provisions should be carefully drafted and exercised in order to
withstand due process challenges in tribal court.
D. Administrative and JudicialReview
Administrative adjudication can be fair without being excessively
formal.43 One way to minimize the formality in permitting is to allow
40. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-570, 701-706 (1994).
41. See generally ARTHUR E. BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASiMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1989).
42. See Suagee & Lowndes, supra note 12.
43. Davis and Pierce suggest that courts "should acquiesce in any decision-making procedure
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affected persons to file administrative appeals in which additional
procedural protections are provided. For example, the initial permit
decision may be made after the ERC has reviewed the application and has
considered the application in a meeting in which tribal agency staff have
had the chance to express any concerns they might have and the applicant
has had an opportunity to respond. An administrative appeal might be
reconsidered at a subsequent meeting after the chance to submit additional
information. Another level of appeal might feature a hearing before the
tribal equivalent of an administrative law judge.
In the federal NEPA process, judicial review has proven critical making
agencies comply. Given tribal sovereign immunity, tribal agencies
generally cannot be sued unless authorized by tribal law or federal statute.
While some tribal courts have found tribal agencies subject to suits for
injunctive relief in the absence of express authorization in tribal
legislation," it is preferable to provide expressly for judicial review in
tribal court after exhaustion of administrative remedies. The scope of such
review can be limited to protect the tribe's interests, and standards can be
provided for tribal courts to apply in deciding whether to uphold or set
aside decisions made by tribal agencies. In addition, if the tribe is seeking
to regulate a kind of activity that may be subject to challenge in federal
court, it generally will serve the tribe's interests to take advantage of the
doctrine of exhaustion of tribal court remedies and provide the opportunity
for the tribal court(s) to decide the scope of tribal jurisdiction prior to
federal court review.45
IV. Mechanisms and Processes
This part of the article discusses several kinds of mechanisms and
processes that could be used in a tribal little NEPA. The most appropriate
mix of such mechanisms will vary from tribe to tribe.

chosen by a legislature or by an agency as long as that procedure seems to represent a reasonable,

Eldridge] cost-benefit test." DAvis & PIERCE, supra
good faith application of the Mathews Iv.
note 36, at 67 (citations omitted).
44. See generally Ralph W. Johnson and James M. Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Indian
Tribal Law, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153, 163-64 (1984); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court
Jurisprudence: A Snapshotfrom the Field, 21 VT. L. REV. 7, 21-24 (1996).

45. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa
Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); see Lynn H. Slade, Dispute Resolution in Indian
Country: HarmoninzingNational Farmers Union, Iowa Mutual, and the Abstention Doctrine in
the FederalCourts, 71 N.D. L. REV. 519 (1995); Commentary: Dispute Resolution in Indian
Country: Does Abstention Make the HeartGrow Fonder?, 71 N.D. L. REv. 541 (edited transcript
of symposium discussion).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol21/iss2/4

No. 2]

FASHIONING AN ENVIRONMENTAL CODE

315

A. NEPA-Style Environmental Documents
NEPA requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement
(EIS) for any federal action that significantly affects the quality of the
human environment. The CEQ regulations require the preparation of a less
detailed document known as an environmental assessment (EA) for certain
categories of actions in order to determine whether an EIS is required for
a particular proposed action. If an EA leads to a conclusion by the federal
decision maker that the action will not cause significant impacts, that
official signs a finding of no significant impact (FONSI), which completes
the NEPA process. The CEQ regulations refer to these three kinds of
documents - EISs, EAs, and FONSIs - as "environmental documents."'
These terms, and the concepts they represent, have become so widely used
in environmental review processes in the United States that they set the
standard. A tribal little NEPA might try to improve on this standard, but
this article maintains that it would be advisable to build on these concepts
rather than try to fashion something completely different.
1. Environmental Impact Statements
For many kinds of proposed actions within Indian reservations some
kinds of federal action is required, such as the approval by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) of a transaction relating to trust or restricted land.
Such an action is subject to NEPA and, if it may cause significant impacts,
will require an EIS. The subset of actions that may cause significant
impacts but not require a federal action may be relatively small, depending
on factors such as how much fee land is located within a reservation and
the extent to which the tribe has taken over or otherwise limited the role
of the BIA. Since this subset is likely to be small, there may be little point
in reinventing the EIS process. Thus the Model Tribal Environmental
Review Code simply provides that an EIS will be prepared in accordance
with the CEQ regulations.47 This is not to suggest that the CEQ
regulations are perfect. Suggested improvements in the CEQ regulations,
however, are beyond the scope of this article.
In the context of actions that require EISs, the principal benefit of a
tribal little NEPA might be to clarify the kinds of actions that require EISs
and to expedite the decision-making process. The BIA has established a
pattern of not requiring EISs unless there is substantial pressure from other
agencies or members of Congress, and tribes generally do not push for
EISs to be done on proposals that they want to go forward. Like other
kinds of actors, tribes often resist having EISs prepared (unless they object

46. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.10 (1996).

As defined in this section, the term "environmental

document" also includes a Notice of Intent to prepare an environmental impact statement.
47. Model Tribal Code, supra note 6, § 706.
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to a project and want to delay or stop it). In such cases, an EA may go
through several revisions trying to make it support a FONSI and, in the
process, taking about as much time as would have been required to prepare
an EIS. In part this is because some tribal leaders are not comfortable with
public participation in their decision-making processes. Attorneys with a
background in environmental law may have become so accustomed to
public participation in government agency decision making that they
assume others share the assumption that public participation is a good
thing. Tribal officials and staff may not share this assumption. Attorneys
working with tribes in negotiating the federal NEPA process, or in
developing tribal little NEPAs, should devote some attention to articulating
the benefits of public participation in order to help tribal officials and staff
determine how much public participation is appropriate in particular
circumstances. One benefit of public participation that we feel compelled
to note is the potential to expand the range of alternatives under
consideration.
2. Environmental Assessments
The preparation of EAs has become a common practice under NEPA
and under the state little NEPAs, and a tribal little NEPA should make use
of this level of environmental documentation. In the CEQ regulations EAs
serve to determine whether or not an EIS is required. Although the
regulations also encourage EAs to be prepared to aid in planning and
decision making, most agencies do not prepare (or require applicants to
prepare) them unless required, i.e., unless an action does not fit within a
categorical exclusion. The development of detailed mitigation plans in EAs
in order to avoid significant environmental impacts has become an
accepted practice. Even where the driving force behind such mitigation
plans is to avoid the public scrutiny involved in the EIS process, the
avoidance of significant environmental impacts serves the purposes of
NEPA. In such cases an EA is more than a procedural exercise.
The Model Tribal Environmental Review Code makes the preparation
of an EA the standard practice for applicants seeking development permits.
The basic idea is that tribal officials should routinely ask to see the EA
before taking a position on a proposed development that will affect the
environment. If tribal staff and external applicants know that EAs will be
used in decision making, the EAs that are prepared are more likely to be
written as planning and decision-making tools.
The Model Code provides two kinds of exceptions to the EA
requirement. The Model Code authorizes the Environmental Review
Commission (ERC) to develop a list of categorical exclusions through
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rulemaking.48 This is the same basic concept used in the federal NEPA
process to sweep categories of actions out of NEPA review if they
generally do not cause significant impacts. Such actions would still require
permits. In addition, the Model Code allows the ERC to develop a list of
kinds of activities that are considered "low-impact development" which are
subject to a simplified review process involving decisions by the ERC
Chairman rather than the full Commission and which do not require the
preparation of an EA.4
B. Permits to Control Development
If a tribal agency is charged with carrying out an environmental review
process for development activities, a permit process is one kind of
mechanism for performing such duties. NEPA itself does not establish a
permit requirement but instead applies to any federal action that may
significantly affect the human environment, so NEPA does not provide a
model for a permit mechanism. By contrast, the ALI's Model Land
Development Code does require a permit for any kind of activity that falls
within the statutory definition of "development."
A major advantage of a permit requirement is that it is relatively easy
for tribal staff to know if a project is in compliance with the tribal law -

either it has been issued a permit or it has not. A permit process is not
necessary for a tribe to exercise control over development on tribally
owned land, but making such a requirement apply to tribal administrative
agencies and tribal business enterprises could facilitate environmental
review by tribal officials. For development on individual Indian lands or
on fee lands, a permit requirement could function as a critical mechanism,
allowing a tribe to assert the full measure of its sovereign authority to
protect important tribal interests, including public health and safety and
respect for tribal environmental and cultural values.
1. A Comprehensive or "Blanket" Permit
If the main legislative objective for enacting a tribal little NEPA is to
control development on the reservation, then a permit requirement that
applies to all kinds of development activities, or at least to all kinds of
development activities above a certain threshold level, may be the most
appropriate way to achieve this objective. The more comprehensive the
coverage of a permit requirement, the bigger the blanket, the better the
responsible tribal agency can control development. In addition, a blanket
permit requirement can help to achieve the other legislative objectives
discussed in part I of this article, and may be particularly useful to achieve
the objective of coordinating the environmental review of proposed

48. Id. § 505(d).
49. Id. §§ 201(c), 502.
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development activities. Both the Model Tribal Environmental Review Code
and Vermont's Act 250 feature a blanket permit requirement.
a) Permitting Under the Model Tribal Code
The Model Tribal Environmental Review Code features a development
permit based on the ALI Model Code, which would be issued by a tribal
Environmental Review Commission (ERC). Permit decisions are made by
the ERC using an informal adjudicatory process. In the Model Tribal
Code, the term "development" is broadly defined in the statutory language
to include any building operation, any material change in a structure, or
any material change in the use or appearance of land." The permit
requirement expressly applies to development activities proposed by tribal
administrative agencies.5 A tribe using this Model might expressly
exclude certain kinds of development activities that usually have minimal
adverse environmental impacts. This Model also provides that the tribal
ERC would have authority to issue rules to define a category of "lowimpact" development for which the permit process would be a largely
ministerial function. It may be advisable to use a time table in making the
permit requirement apply, with bigger projects subject to compliance
sooner than smaller projects. This would enable the tribal ERC and tribal
staff to focus their efforts on projects that really matter while they are
learning how to run a permit program.
b) Vermont's Act 250
Vermont Act 250 also uses a permit requirement, which covers:
(1) developments involving the construction of housing projects or mobile
homes and trailer parks of ten or more units; (2) commercial or industrial
development or improvement on a tract of more than one acre in towns
without permanent zoning and/or subdivision bylaws and such development
on a tract of more than ten acres in towns with such controls; (3) any
subdivision of land for sale into ten or more lots created over a continuous
period of ten years; (4) any state or municipal construction involving more
than ten acres; and (5) all developments above an elevation of 2500 feet.52
The original Act contains broad exemptions for farming and forestry
pradtices below 2500 feet and it exempts construction of electrical
generating and transmission facilities (which are regulated by the Public
Service Board). 3 In 1995, the Vermont legislature added an exemption

50. The definition of "development" is in section 201 of the draft Model Tribal Code, supra
note 6. For further discussion of the definition of "development," see the ALl MODEL LAND DEV.
CODE at 16-26. See also Suagee, supra note 20, at 429-44.
51. Model Tribal Code, supra note 6,§ 501
52. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6021 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
53. Id. § 6001(3).
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for certain rock mining operations. Many projects escape review under the
Act's jurisdictional criteria, and the cumulative effect of such exemptions
can be quite significant.
2. Criteriafor Permit Decisions

If an agency is vested with authority to issue permits, the legislation
giving it such authority should provide standards for the agency to use in
making permit decisions. Three ways of doing this are: (a) to set out
general policy criteria in the statute; (b) to require the permitting agency
to determine whether or not the project would be consistent with an
approved land use plan (a plan which may be the responsibility of a
different agency to development); and (c) to create a checklist to ensure
that the project will comply with all applicable requirements established by
other laws and regulations. A little NEPA might use a combination of
these ways of providing standards for the permitting agency.
a) General Policy Criteria

Vermont's Act 250 provides an example of a permit requirement in
which decision makers must apply general policy criteria. The Act takes
a "holistic" approach to development. It combines pollution prevention
with resources conservation rather than treating these as separate problems
and looks at community stability and economic sustainability. It does not
rely on "one size fits all" technical standards, or cookie cutter approaches,
but takes a fresh look at each problem to find the most appropriate solution
reflecting the latest thinking.
The Act establishes ten general criteria for permit issuance,' 4 under
which each permit applicant is required to show that the project:
(1) will not result in undue water or air pollution;
(2) has sufficient water for its reasonably foreseeable future needs;
(3) will not cause an unreasonable burden on existing water supply;
(4) will not cause unreasonable erosion or reduction in the ability of the
land to hold water;
(5) will not cause unreasonable congestion or unsafe conditions on
highways or other transportation facilities;
(6) will not cause an unreasonable burden on the ability of a
municipality to provide education services;
(7) will not place an unreasonable burden on the ability of local
government to provide governmental services;
(8) will not have an undue adverse effect on the scenic or natural beauty
of the area, aesthetics, historic sites, or rare and irreplaceable natural areas;
(9) is in conformance with statewide plans required by Act 250;

54. Id. § 6086(a).
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(10) is in conformance with any duly adopted local or regional plan or
capital program.
These criteria are very general and subjective, and there is no statewide
land use plan against which to measure an individual project's compliance
with the criteria, or to give guidance on where development should and
should not take place. Partly as a result of the general nature of these
criteria, the permit-by-permit review process can be lengthy and
contentious. In 1989, the legislature passed Act 200, a law spearheaded by
Governor Madeleine Kunin, to spur more regional and town planning, but
it has been under constant political attack and has had little effect.
b) A Land Use and Development Plan
In conjunction with general criteria, or as an alternative, a tribal little
NEPA might require the permitting agency to find that a proposed project
would be consistent with an approved tribal land use and development
plan. This would be one of the main functions of the ERC under the
Model Tribal Environmental Review Code. Such a plan could be similar
to a land use plan adopted pursuant to a typical zoning code but might be
more flexible. Rather than providing that certain kinds of development can
only take place in, certain areas, as zoning codes do, the plan might
describe the kinds of development that the tribe wants to encourage and
provide a set of standards for the ERC to use in determining whether
development proposed in an application is consistent with the plan. The
plan also might include areas of special tribal concern in which
development proposals would be more strictly scrutinized. Recent case law
should be taken into account in the development and approval of any such
plan to improve the likelihood that it will be sustained if subjected to legal
challenge.
Under the Model Tribal Code, the plan would not be developed by the
ERC but rather by tribal staff in an appropriate administrative agency of
tribal government, such as a tribal planning or natural resources
department. The ERC, however, would be directed to facilitate public
involvement in reviewing the other agency's plan, including for example,
holding a hearing on the plan. The ERC would be directed to make
recommendations to the tribal governing body regarding the plan. The
formal adoption of the plan would be by action of the tribal governing
body (in a tribe with separation of powers, the legislature with approval of
the executive).
By separating the development of the plan from the consistency
determination required for permit issuance, the tribal governing body
would maintain direct authority over the underlying policy decisions
regarding the kinds of development that would be appropriate for the
reservation, while the permit decisions on specific proposals would be
insulated from political pressures. In this way the independence of the
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permitting agency could be maintained, but the permitting agency's
decisions nevertheless would reflect the tribal governing body's policy
decisions. (In the option of delegating permit authority to the ERC subject
to a veto by the tribal legislature, as discussed earlier in this article, the
statutory language of the tribal little NEPA might provide that an allowable
basis for the exercise of a legislative veto would be a determination by the
legislature that the proposed development would not be consistent with the
tribal land use and development plan.) Under the Model Tribal Code tribal
administrative agencies would be subject to the permit requirement, and,
since administrative due process requires an unbiased decision maker, some
degree of independence of the permitting agency is desirable for due
process reasons. In any permit application by a tribal agency, the ERC
would be required to independently determine whether the proposed action
would be consistent with the tribe's land use and development plan,
whether the environmental assessment is adequate, and whether the project
would result in significant environmental impacts.5
c) A Checklist of Other Review Requirements

A third way of providing standards for a permitting agency would be to
require a determination that the proposed action would comply with the
requirements of all applicable laws and regulations. (NEPA-style
documents are supposed to discuss other environmental review and
consultation requirements, but NEPA itself does not make compliance with
such requirements a precondition of agency action.) Of course, making
such a determination can prove anything but easy, involving the interplay
of complex legal issues and educated judgment about the likely impacts of
proposed actions. 6 If a tribal permitting agency is required to do this, it
must have staff that is adequate to the task, and the staff must be
authorized to interact with the staff of other government agencies, not just
tribal but also federal, state and local.
3. Permitsfor Specific Kinds of Resources

For a variety of reasons, a tribal legislature may not want to establish
a blanket permit requirement. For example, vesting a tribal government
agency with permitting authority may run counter to a tribe's cultural
values, or a tribe may lack the kind of financial and human resources that
would be required to administer and enforce a blanket permit requirement.

55. Model Tribal Code, supra note 6, § 703.
56. See Michael O'Connell, Permitting Issues Affecting Development of Natural Resources
On and Near Indian Reservations (paper presented at, and included in the course materials for,
the American Bar Association Section of Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law 7th
Annual Conference on Natural Resources Development and Environmental Protection on Indian
Lands, Seattle, Wash., Oct. 19-20, 1995).
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If human and financial resource constraints comprise the main reasons for
deciding against a blanket permit, a tribal legislature might consider
enacting a permit requirement of limited scope, a permit focused on
specific kinds of resources. Possible subjects for a limited scope permit
include: discharges into surface waters and/or wetlands; stationary sources
of air pollution; mun*icipal solid waste landfills; archaeological resources
and the graves of ancestors.
Giving a tribal agency authority to administer a limited scope permit
process could be a step toward a blanket permit process. As other subjects
become priorities and as resources permit, the tribal legislature could
expand the permitting agency's mandate. An agency that issues permits for
consumptive uses of water might be given authority to enforce water
quality standards; an agency that issues permits for the excavation of
archaeological resources might be given a mandate to review proposed
actions that would affect historic properties. One drawback to this
approach is that, if different agencies are given authority for different
limited scope permits, institutional factors may render it difficult to
establish a truly comprehensive and coordinated permit process. As
agencies become established in carrying out their particular assigned roles,
the people who run these agencies may resist attempts to set up a different
agency with authority over them.
C. Negotiated Plans
Compliance with applicable environmental review requirements may not
be a simple matter of yes or no. For example, under some federal statutes
compliance can be negotiated by the project proponent, government
agencies, and other interested parties. Negotiation may be particularly
appropriate where an agency has authority to require a project proponent
to mitigate adverse impacts as a condition of issuing a permit or otherwise
giving clearance. This section examines two examples of negotiated
mitigation plans under federal law, wetlands mitigation banking under the
Clean Water Act and habitat conservation plans under the Endangered
Species Act. In both of these examples federal agencies have used
agreements to expedite specific projects by broadening the scope of
mitigation - if project proponents agree to do mitigation on a broad scale
then specific projects can go forward with minimal review. Whether a
tribal little NEPA features a permit requirement or just requires that
NEPA-style documents be prepared before tribal officials make decisions
on proposed actions, tribal lawmakers should consider authorizing tribal
agencies to negotiate such agreements, especially if a major objective of
tribal lawmakers is not to stop development but rather to ensure that
environmental impacts are acceptable.
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1. Wetlands Mitigation Banking
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires a permit to discharge
dredge or fill material into "waters of the United States," a term that
includes wetlands. 7 The U.S Army Corps of Engineers (COE) issues
section 404 permits but shares authority with the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in the administration of the 404 program. EPA
sets substantive standards for permit issuance and retains the authority to
veto individual permits. Under a 1990 Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA),5" EPA and COE have defined mitigation requirements for 404
permits. The MOA establishes a goal of "no net loss" of wetland function
and values, and institutes a "sequencing" process requiring that permits be
analyzed in the following step-wise fashion: (a) Avoidance: no permit will
be granted if there is a "practicable alternative" to the wetland discharge;
(b) Minimization: all "appropriate and practicable" steps must be taken to
minimize adverse impacts; (c) Compensatory Mitigation: unavoidable
losses of wetland functions can be compensated by, for example,
restoration of degraded wetlands or creation of manmade wetlands. 9
a) Federal Guidance
The MOA between EPA and COE provides that mitigation banking may
be an acceptable form of the compensatory mitigation. In 1995 the COE
and EPA, joined by two other federal agencies, issued "Federal Guidance
for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Mitigation Banks" (the
Guidance).'" The Guidance defines wetland mitigation banking as "the
restoration, creation, enhancement and, in exceptional circumstances,
preservation of wetlands and/or other aquatic resources expressly for the
purpose of providing compensatory mitigation in advance of authorized
impacts to similar resources.""' Some of the key points contained in the
Guidance follow:62
(1) Credits can only be used to compensate unavoidable wetland losses.
(2) Banks will be limited to a defined service area, which may be a
watershed or political unit of government.

57. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1996); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1996).
58. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act
Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines (Feb. 6, 1990) (on file with the American Indian Law Review)
[hereinafter Memorandum of Agreement].

59. Id.
60. 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605 (1995).
61. Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 58.
62. Id.
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(3) The Mitigation MOA requires on-site mitigation where practical;
therefore, to use a bank (which is by definition off-site), a developer must
demonstrate that on-site mitigation is not practical.
(4) The Mitigation MOA also requires that mitigation must, where ever
practicable, be in kind, meaning that it must replace the same functions as
those lost (e.g., water quality for water quality).
(5) Bank sponsors must demonstrate financial capability.
(6) Credits cannot be used until the aquatic functions have been
established at the banking site.
(7) Banks must provide for protection of wetlands in perpetuity through
appropriate property transfers (e.g., conservation easements).
(8) ]Banks must monitor for at least five years and take necessary
corrective action as problems arise.
b) An Example
A simple example may illustrate how a mitigation bank works. Some
entity, it may be a governmental agency, an environmental organization or
even a private entrepreneur, decides to establish a mitigation bank. It files
a "prospectus" with the COE, setting forth the objectives of the bank, how
it will be administered and a lot of information about the physical
conditions of the site. If approved, after review by the COE and other
agencies, the COE will issue a "banking instrument" and form an
Interagency Mitigation Bank Review Team to guide further development
of the bank. Credits and debits are the terms used to designate the units
of trade. Credits represent the attainment of aquatic functions at a bank;
debits represent the loss of aquatic functions at the project site. Credits are
debited from a bank when they are used to offset aquatic resource impacts
for the purpose of meeting 404 requirements. By purchasing credits from
an approved bank, developers can greatly simplify the 404 permit process.
c) Commentary
From an environmental standpoint, the advantage of wetland banks is
that they can create larger and more valuable wetlands than the typical
postage stamp mitigation project that accompanies 404 permits. On the
other hand, the risk is that banking will simply facilitate more development
in wetlands. The key may be how firmly the regulatory agencies enforce
the avoidance requirement in the permit process. In cases where there is
truly no way to avoid wetland impacts, the banking approach is probably
an improvement over the current mitigation methodology.
2. Habitat Conservation Plansfor Listed Species
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits (and makes
criminal) the unauthorized "taking" of any animal on the list of threatened
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or endangered species. 3 The ESA defines the term "taking" to include
"harm" and Department of Interior rules further define "harm" to include
habitat modification that actually kills or injures a species by substantially
interfering with essential breeding, feeding or sheltering activities. The
U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld this aspect of the DOI rules.'
Section 10 of the ESA provides a way around the "taking" prohibition
by authorizing the issuance of incidental "taking" permits. An incidental
"taking" is one that occurs in the course of carrying out an otherwise
lawful activity - for example, logging the forest habitat of the Northern
Spotted Owl. To get an incidental taking permit, a person must submit a
Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) to the Secretary of Interior (or
Commerce for marine species). The HCP must demonstrate that the
applicant has done everything possible to minimize the "taking" of the
protected species and has offset any loss of habitat that would cause an
injury.
The HCP process was added to the ESA in the 1982 amendments.' As
of August 1996, approximately 200 HCPs were being developed. Since
then about 50 HCPs have been approved.' More recently, the HCP
process has taken on a larger regional scope, incorporating a multispecies
approach. Regional HCPs are being developed around Austin, Texas, in
the Balcones Canyonlands and in Southern California, home of the
California gnatcatcherY These plans are using the latest conservation
biology methodologies to come up with plans to insure the viability of
species populations on a landscape scale over a long period of time,
typically 100 years. With such negotiated plans in place, wildlife agencies
have reasonable assurances that the loss of individuals will not threaten the
long-term viability of a species, and development projects are permitted to
proceed.
V. Enforcement and Dispute Resolution
A tribe must be willing and able to enforce compliance with its little
NEPA. This article offers but a few comments on this topic. In order to
withstand legal challenge, a tribal permit requirement that applies to fee

63. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994).
64. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687
(1995).
65. Endangered Species Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6(1) to (3), (4)(A), 96
Stat. 1411.
66. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERv., HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK 1 (1996).
67. J.B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning Under the EndangeredSpecies
Act: Pushing the Legal and PracticalLimits of Species Protection,44 Sw. L.J. 1393, 1413
(1991).
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lands should be crafted to protect tribal interests that have been recognized
by Congress or that meet the second prong of the Montana test.68 In
enacting tribal legislation to establish such a requirement, the tribal
legislature may want to focus attention on the tribal interests to be
protected, holding hearings and otherwise creating a legislative history to
support the tribe's exercise of regulatory power.
A. Enforcement by Tribal Government Agencies
The Model Tribal Environmental Review Code authorizes the
Chairperson of the ERC to issue orders to persons alleged to be acting in
violation of the Code.' The full ERC would conduct an adjudicatory
hearing to determine if a violation of the Code has occurred. In any such
hearing, the tribe's attorney general, with assistance from the Commission's
staff, would present the evidence of a violation. If a violation is found, the
ERC could issue an order directing the violator to take corrective action
and/or imposing civil penalties. The Model Code also authorizes the
assessment of costs against a violator if a tribal administrative agency
takes corrective action after the violator's failure to do so.
Obviously, there are other ways in which enforcement can be pursued.
Any option will require a commitment of funds and people.
B. Private Actions in Tribal Agencies and Courts
As noted earlier, the fact that private citizens can sue federal agencies
has proven to be a critical factor in federal agency compliance with NEPA.
The Model Tribal Environmental Review Code does not expressly
authorize actions in tribal court against tribal administrative agencies,
although tribal courts might interpret the language in the Model Code as
authorizing such suits."' It might be preferable to make this explicit, and
to include appropriate limits on the kinds of relief that tribal courts can
order.
Citizen involvement is interwoven throughout Vermont's Act 250. The
Act is administered in a "bottom-up" manner through nine District
Environmental Commissions, each comprised of three citizens appointed
by the Governor. Each District Commission is assigned a Coordinator to
help with the permit process. Permit decisions are made through a quasijudicial hearing process. Affected landowners and other interested parties,
including environmental groups, are allowed to intervene, present evidence
and argue for or against the project. District Commission decisions can be
appealed by any party to the nine-member, gubernatorially appointed

68. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). See sources cited supra note 10.
69. Model Tribal Code, supra note 6, pt. 8.
70. Id. § 805. Any person who is aggrieved by the issuance or denial of a development
permit can appeal, as can any person who is the subject of an enforcement order.
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Environmental Board, which hears cases de novo. Less than five percent
of permit decisions are appealed.7
C. Alternative Dispute Resolution
In environmental disputes, there are usually more than two sides, and
so the use of nonadversarial dispute resolution techniques (often called
"alternative dispute resolution" or ADR) may be productive. When
fashioning a tribal little NEPA, there are many ways in which ADR could
be worked in, at both the administrative adjudication stage and the judicial
review stage. ADR techniques can be a way of fashioning "win-win"
solutions, and, in doing so, holding down the governmental agency's
enforcement costs. Dispute resolution techniques that the larger American
society might label ADR are well grounded in many tribal cultures.72
Where a tribal culture has a tradition of nonadversarial dispute resolution,
it may be particularly effective to incorporate such a tradition into a tribal
little NEPA.
Conclusion
By enacting a tribal mini-NEPA, a tribe can take an important step
toward protecting the reservation environment by pro-actively controlling
the adverse impacts of "development." A tribe with a mini-NEPA can
ensure that critical questions are asked up front, that an appropriate range
of alternatives is dreamed up and analyzed when a development project is
under consideration, and that mitigation measures are fashioned before the
decision is made to allow a project to be carried out. A mini-NEPA can
empower tribal officials and tribal members to shape the way
"development" is planned and carried out so that it reinforces and does not
jeopardize tribal cultural values and practices.
If these benefits are to be realized, the tribal legislation must be crafted
so that it can be carried out, so that it becomes part of the living culture
of the tribal community. The tribal agencies and institutions that are
assigned responsibilities must have adequate authority and resources to do
their jobs. The relationships among agencies and institutions must be
worked out so that checks and balances function as intended, and so they
do not become either dreaded obstructions or mere paper requirements that
are ignored in practice. One way to avoid the possibility of the
requirements of a mini-NEPA being ignored is to grant jurisdiction to
tribal courts to hear complaints for injunctive relief against tribal agencies.
Such a limited waiver of tribal sovereign immunity should be counter-

71. 2 BROOKS, supra note 26, at 30.
72. See, e.g., James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and
Accommodation to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L. Rav. 89 (1983).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

balanced by developing the capabilities of tribal agencies to process
administrative appeals, and tribal courts to hear appeals from agency
decisions, in an expeditious manner so that the requirements of a miniNEPA do not become obstructions.
More than a quarter century ago, NEPA worked a basic change in the
way that federal agencies make decisions that affect the environment - by
requiring agencies to prepare documents analyzing the impacts of their
decisions and by giving the affected public and other governmental
agencies the right to participate in the process through which the analyses
are done and the documents written. It was a change for the good. Maybe
the time has come for the same kind of change in Indian country, a change
that would be brought about through tribal legislation tailored to the
specific circumstances of each tribe. By enacting and implementing a tribal
little NEPA, tribal leaders can demonstrate their understandings of the
principle that sovereignty carries' responsibilities, responsibilities for the
welfare of all the people who are currently subject to tribal jurisdiction, but
not just for them. Also for future generations, for the graves of ancestors,
for culturally important plants and animals, and for places in the natural
world that tribal people regard as sacred.
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